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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE H. CONN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 8927

RICH WHITMORE,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDE,NT

(Numbers in parenthesis refer to pages of the record.
The parties will be referred to here as they appeared in
the court below.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal from a judgment entered in favor
of defendant and against plaintiff. The action was based
upon an alleged judgment obtained by plaintiff against
defendant in Illinois. No personal service was made upon defendant in Illinois. He was served in Utah. Plaintiff sought to bring himself within paragraphs 16 and 17
of ·Chapter 110, Illinois Revised Statutes, 1955. The trial
court held the Illinois court had no jurisdiction over defendant and the judgment was void and hence entered
judgment for defendant.
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Plaintiff in his brief makes no effort to make a statement of facts.' The facts 'underlying the attempted assertion of jurisdiction are material in the determination of
this case.
Plaintiff was a veterinarian and in the business of
selling Arabian horses. His place of business was at
Freeport, Illinois. Under date of February 1, 1955, he
sent to plaintiff by mail (16) an offering of registered
Arabian horses (Exhibit D-3). The two horses eventually
purchased by defendant were there listed. So far as
material here such offer provided:
"Khiffr.aff * * * We are making very attractive price on this filly of $1,000.00.
"* * * Khiffah * * * bay mare, 19 years old* * •
we are going to price this mare at less than her
1955 foal should be worth. The price is $750.00. ''
(Exhibit D-3)
Some time in April plaintiff wrote defendant in an
attempt to sell him three horses. Then he wrote another
letter stating that one of them was already sold and if
defendant wanted the other two, he better make up his
mind about it (15). Defendant recalled that he had a
friend by the name of Dr. Wm. L. ~fonson who lived near
plaintiff. He called Dr. Monson on the telephone and
asked him to check the quality of plaintiff's horses. He
reported favorably (13, 15, 16). Defendant mailed a letter
from Salt Lake City accepting the offer and enclosing a
checkfor $1,000.00, part payment for the tw-o horses (18).
Defendant then sent Mr. Carpenter, his en1ployee, to
Freeport, Illinois, to pick up the horses (13, 14). He took
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3
with him a check for $750.00 which he delivered to plaintiff at the time he picked up the horses (14).
These are the basic facts upon which the trial court
rendered judgment for defendant.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE ILLINOIS JUDGMENT HEREIN SUED UPON IS
NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT UNDER
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BECAUSE SAID
JUDGMENT IS VOID 'FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
POINT II
THE ILLINOIS STATUTE RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF TO VALIDATE HIS JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPLICABLE BE CAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TRANSACT ANY
BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE OF ILLINOIS WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THAT STATUTE.
1

POINT III
IF THE ILLINOIS STATUTE WERE HELD APPLICABLE TO 1THIS CASE THEN SUCH CONS'TRUCTIO:r{
WOULD VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS .CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
'THE ILLINOIS JUDGMENT HEREIN SUED UPON IS
NOT ENTITLED TO FULL FAITH AND CREDIT UNDER
THE UNITED STATES 'CONSTITUTION BECAUSE SAID
JUDGMENT IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.

It is thoroughly settled that the United States Constitutional provision (Article IV, Section 1), that full
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faith and credit shall be given in each State to the judicial proceedings in other States does not preclude inquiry
into the jurisdiction of the court in which the judgment
is rendered or into the facts necessary to give such jurisdiction.
It is also thoroughly settled that if the court did not
have jurisdiction then any judgment rendered by it is void
and would not come within the protection of the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution and other States
would not need to enforce any of the terms or provisions
of such judgment.
The following cases support the foregoing propositions: Williams v. N orlh Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.C.
1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577; MiUiken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 61
S.C. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278; Wampler v. Wampler, 25 Wash.
2d 2'58, 170 p .2d 316.
Defendant here asserts lack of jurisdiction based on
two propositions. Only through the provisions of Sections 16 and 17, Chapter 110 of the Revised Statutes of
Illinois, 1955, could plaintiff obtain jurisdiction over defendant. The purchase by defendant of the two horses
under the situation presented here could not bring this
case within the provisions of that statute and hence the
jurisdiction of the Illinois court fails upon that ground.
The other proposition contended for by defendant only
need be considered in the event defendant is not correct
upon his first proposition. If this s~tute is made applicable to the factual situation presented in the case at bar,
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then such application violates the Due Process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
Upon either of these grounds the Illinois court would
lack jurisdiction and its judgment would be void.
POINT II
THE ILLINOIS STATUTE RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF TO VALIDATE HIS JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT TRANSACT ANY
BUSINESS WITHIN 'THE STATE OF ILLINOIS WITHIN
THE MEANING OF THAT STATUTE.

Section 17, Chapter 110 Illinois Revised Statutes,
1955, so far as material here, provides :
"(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or
resident of this State, who in person or through
an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause
of action arising from the doing of any of said
acts:
" (a)

The transaction of any business within
this State;

"(b)

The commission of a tortious act within
this State;

" (c)

The ownership, use, or possession of
any real estate situated in this State;

" (d)

Contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting.

*

*

*

"(3) Only causes of action arising from acts
enumerated· herein may be asserted against a de-
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f endant in an action in which jurisdiction over him
is based upon this section."
It is the contention of plaintiff that this case falls
within subdivision (a) of the foregoing statute. It should
be observed that this was not the transaction of any business of the defendant. Plaintiff was the one that was in
the business of selling horses.
Defendant had no office nor place of business in the
State of Illinois, he merely accepted an offer by plaintiff
to sell horses.
The acceptance of the offer occurred when defendant
mailed the acceptance and $1,000.00 payment. For this
reason the contract herein involved was not even made in
Illinois. It was a contract entered into at the time the
acceptance was mailed in Utah. 1 Williston on Contracts,
Third Edition, Section 81.
Defendant picked up the horses through his agent.
We submit that it was never contemplated by the enactment of this statute that this type of transaction would
subject a buyer to the jurisdiction of the Illinois courts.
If this is applicable, then persons buying by catalogue
from mail order houses would be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts where the order is filled. The fact that
an agent was sent to pick up the horses is only incidental
and would not materially distinguish this case from a mail
order case. Cases have construed this Illinois statute
and indicate that the statute is not applicable here.
In Grobark v . .Addo Machine Comp(J;ny, 18 Ill. App.
2d 10, 151 N.E. 2d 425 (1958), an action was commenced
to recover damages for interference with contract rights.
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A summons was served under the foregoing statute. A
motion to quash the service was granted and on appeal
affirmed. Plaintiff sold adding machines which it purchased from defendant. Defendant was a New York corporation not licensed to do business in Illinois and with
its headquarters in New York. In 1953 defendant sent a
letter to plaintiff appointing him exclusive distributor
in the greater part of Illinois. Thereafter defendant advised plaintiff that the distributorship would be cancelled.
In concluding that the defendant was not transacting any
business within the meaning of this statute, the court
pointed out that it maintained no offices in Illinois nor
did it 'employ anyone there. We submit that this case is
analogous to the present case and shows that there must
be more of a contact with the State of Illinois than exists
here in order to subject a person to the jurisdiction of its
courts.
In Orton v. Woods Ovl & G.as Company, 249 F. 2d
198, the court held the situation presented did not bring
defendant within the Illinois statute and that hence the
motion to quash the service of summons was properly
granted. One plaintiff w.as a business engineering consultant and the other a lawyer. They performed the
necessary work in Illinois to get defendant company organized and doing business. This work was performed
in Chicago. The summons was served on defendant in
Louisiana. In holding that the statute was not applicable,
the court stated:
"We shall not engage in a further definition
of 'the transaction of any business within this
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State.' It is sufficient here to hold that th~ ~er
formance of the professional services ~y pla~tiffs
for the benefit of defendant as herem outlined,
standing alone, are insufficient to ~ring defendant within any reasonable construction of the Act
in question. To rule otherwise would be to stretch
the doctrine of the International Shoe case to the
breaking point, and to expand t~e illinois concept
of state jurisdiction over nonresidents beyond the
limit imposed by due process."
Plaintiff cites the case of Nelson v. Miller, 11 ill. 2d
378, 143 N.E. 2d 673, as in point here. That case came
within the provisions of subdivision (b) providing that
if a person committed a tortious act in illinois that person
would be subjected to the jurisdiction of the Illinois
courts. It has nothing to do with whether or not business
was transacted within illinois. The wording of subdivision (a) and (b) points up the distinction which should be
made. Subdivision (a) does not provide that if a person
enters into a contract with an individual in Illinois such
person shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
It uses language long familiar to courts, to-wit: the transaction of any business. If the Legislature intended to
cover the present situation it could have worded the
statute so that it would include a situation w·here "a contract was made in Illinois." Subdivision (d) further confirms this contention. Under that subdivision if a person
contracts to insure any person located within lllinois such
person shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts.
I-Iere is a specific provision relating to a contract of insurance. If the Legislature had intended that all persons
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who contracted in illinois or with Illinois residents were
subject to its courts this provision would be unnecessary
because such a contract of necessity would be included
within the provisions of subdivision (a). The use of specific language in subdivision (b) and (d) indicates that
the general language in (a) has a broader application
than to include one transaction of contract.
In Rensing v. Turner Aviation Co., 166 F. Sup. 790,
this latter distinction is suggested. The case involved a
situation under subdivision (b), but the court, in considering this problem, stated:
"Whether this court would also have jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of
Section 17 (1) (a) is questionable since the Act
by its express terms states that the cause of action
must arise from the 'the transaction of any business within this State.' Further, in light of Orton
v. Woods Oil & Gas Co., it might be difficult to
maintain that the defendant's occasional, sporadic
and irregular flights into illinois amounted to such
'minimum contacts' with the territory of the forum
so that the maintenance of a suit in personam
would not 'offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.' To do so might expand
the Illinois concept of State jurisdiction over nonresidents beyond the limit imposed by due
process."
In that case the defendant chartered airplane flights
into Illinois and on one of which plaintiff was injured.
The use of the words "any business" in the statute
does not mean a single act would bring the person within
the statute. In Worcester Felt Pad Corp. v. Tucson A~r-
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10
port Authority, 233 F. 2d 44, in construing the words
"any business" it was held that it meant more than a
single act. The court stated:
"The words 'any business, enterprise, or occupation' do not refer to single act, but instead
to a plurality of acts."
The statute does not say "any contract'' or "any act,"
it uses the word "business" and the use of that word
certainly contemplates that the individual must be in some
type of business which he is transacting. It should not
concern isolated purchases by a person not in any business connected with the sale.
The Utah cases clearly indicate that the type of transaction here involved is not the transacting of any business
within the State of Illinois. Our Utah statutes use the
words "doing any business" (Section 16-8-1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953) and interchange "doing" and "transacting'' (Sections 16-8-2, 3).
In Western G.a;s AppliJances, Inc. v. Servel, Inc., 123
Ut. 2'29, 257 P.2d 950, dismissal of the case for lack of
jurisdiction was affirmed. Plaintiff, for several years,
had been a distributor of defendant's gas and electric
home appliances. Defendant, a Delaware corporation,
had its principal place of business in Indiana. Defendant
terminated this contract with plaintiff and appointed another distributor. The law suit arose out of this termination. Service of summons 'vas made upon the service
manager of defendant who was temporarily within the
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State. The attitude of our court on this subject was expressed as follows:
"No authority has been cited which could support a conclusion, that the activities of defendant
herein above enumerated, are sufficient to render
a foreign corporation amenable to process. It is
indisputable that the mere presence here of an
officer of a foreign corporation will not subject it
to suit, nor will the sale of goods at a foreign
factory to an independent distributor located
within this state; neither is the aiding of the
distributor in his duties of promoting sales and
servicing activities of independent dealers (retailers) through instructing or training them and
their employees; nor the giving of a warranty and
the shipping to an independent dealer the parts
and units to meet its terms.
"It is also well settled that an isolated transaction such as the installation of the one air-conditioning unit and heating system would not create
the status of doing business here. As the court
said in Dahl v. Collette:

"'* * * if * * * (the corporation's presence) is
manifested only by casual, sporadic, or isolated
exertions of the kind which it ordinarily performs,
these indicia of its presence are too equivocal and
uncertain to support the inference that it is doing
business here.'
"Thus before defendant's acts could properly
be classified as doing business within the State,
it would have to be shown that there was some
degree of continuity or regularity of such acts,
coupled with some manner of entering into direct
business transactions with others. If such circumstances did exist, the acts of defendant herein
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shown might properly be considered in augmentation of other proof as to doing business.
.
"We are appreciative of the fact ~~at the
policy underlying decisions_ of t~e court ~ cases
such as this requires consideration of fru.r play
to citizens desiring to seek redress in court for
claimed injuries, as well as to the fact that foreign
corporations who do business here should not be
afforded any unfair advantage against local competing companies who pay taxes and licenses for
doing business here and are subject to the jurisdiction of our courts.
"But jurisdiction of citizens of other states
may not be arbitrarily conferred by the law, nor
assumed by the courts, of sister states. Under the
federal constitution as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court, the authority of state
courts over foreign corporations is limited to circumstances where they do 'business in the state
* * * in such a manner and to such an extent that
its actual presence there is established.'
"In this context, as noted in International
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, the term 'presence' is
" 'used merely to symbolize those activities of
the corportion's agent within the state which
courts will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the deInands of due process.' "
See also McGr~ff 'l'. Charles Antell, Inc., 123 lTt. 166,
256 P.2d 703; .Alw.ard ·r. Green, 122 Ut. 35, 245 P.2d 855;
Dykes v. ReliJable F·zwni·ture & Carpet, 3 lTt. 2d 34, 277
P.2d 969, East Coast D~count Gorp. v. Reynolds, 4 Ut.
2d 362, 325 P.2d 853; Prndent·£al Federal Sa.t'ings & Loan
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Assoc. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 7 Ut. 2d
366, 325 P.2d 899.
The foregoing cases also stand for the proposition
that a single transaction does not make a person amenable
to the courts of the state wherein the transaction vvas
had. Illinois has also ruled in accordance with these cases.
Fimch & Company v. Zenith Furnace Company, 245 Ill.
586, 92 N.E. 521.
In view of the fact that the contract for the purchase
of the horses in the case at bar was entered into in Utah
the following quotation from Alward v. Green, supra, is
particularly applicable.
"The fundamental difficulty with the plaintiff's contention in this case, under our rules, is
that his cause of action did not arise out of any
business transacted by him with the defendant in
the State of Utah. His contract was made with the
defendant in the State of California and is subject
to the laws and rules and regulations of the State
of California, and his cause of action is based upon
a breach of his contract entered into with the defendant in the State of California."
Defendant, in his brief at Page 10, cites cases to the
effect that statutes similar to that in Illinois have been
upheld. These cases are not in point and the very language of the statutes involved in those cases indicate the
inapplicability of the Illinois statute to the situation in
the case at bar.
In Smythe v. Twiln St.ate Improvement Corp., 116 Vt.
569, 80 A.2d 664, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1193, a Vermont statute
provided that if a foreign corporation makes a contract
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with a resident of Vermont to be performed in whole or
in part in Vermont against a resident of Vermont, such
act shall be deemed doing business and the corporation
shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of Vermont. In the first place this case sounded in tort and the
statute specifically applied to the commission of a tort
in Vermont. If a contract were involved the statute there
would specifically cover the situation. The Illinois statute
does not refer to a contract, but only relates to the transaction of any business.
In Jones v. Bay State Abrasive Products Company,
89 F. Sup. 654 and Compawie De.Astral v. Boston Metals
Company, 205 l\1:d. 338, 107 A.2d 357, a Maryland statute
was involved. That statute provided that every foreign
corporation should be subject to suit in Maryland on any
cause of action arising out of a contract made within
Maryland whether or not such foreign corporation was
doing business or had done business in the state. Here
again, the statute specifically applies to a contract and
not to the transaction of business. This alone distinguishes the cases involving the Maryland statute.
None of the above authorities cited by defendant
would be applicable here because the contract was made
in Utah not in Illinois. Here we have the startling contention that an Illinois court has jurisdiction over a resident in Utah who has made a contract in Utah with an
Illinois resident. Under this principal llOY\'" could it be
asserted that it is either fair or dispensing substantial
justice to subject to the jurisdiction of Illinois courts a
Utah resident· who happens to buy a couple of horses
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from an Illinois resident. No case of which we are aware
has gone this far in holding that a judgment rendered
under such conditions would constitute due process of law.
The most recent case by the United States Supreme
Court, McGee v. InternatiJonal LiJfe Insurance Company,
355 U.S. 220, 78 S. Ct. 199, 2 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1957), does
not go so far. In that case a California statute (similar
to section 17 (1) (d) of the Illinois statute, supra) subjected insurance companies to the jurisdiction of California courts on insurance contracts with residents of
that state even though the company could not be served
in California.
No such situation exists in the case at bar. The defendant there was in the insurance business and the obtaining of a policy holder in California and the receipt
of premiums was the transaction of its business in California. Such situation is a far cry from one where a Utah
resident buys two horses from an Illinois resident and
certainly is not the transaction of any of the Utah resident's business in Illinois.
We submit that under the foregoing .authorities the
purchase of these horses by defendant should not bring
him within the terms of this Illinois statute thereby subjecting him to the jurisdiction of that court and render
him liable upon a judgment made under such circumstances.
POINT III
IF THE ILLINOIS STATUTE WERE HELD APPLICABLE TO 1THIS CASE THEN SUCH CONSTRUCTION
WOULD VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
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FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.

As indicated under Point II, it is our belief that the
situation presented in the case at bar is not one which
would come within the terms and provisions of the Illinois
statute. However, if it does then it is a violation of the
concept of due process of law as embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 25 L. Ed. 565, was for
many years the leading case on this question of jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in sister states.
However, now the principles to be applied have now been
established by the case of Internat~onal Shoe Company v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. ·Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95, 161
A.L.R. 1057 (1945). That case was a proceeding by the
State of Washington to collect unpaid contributions to
the unemployment compensation fund. Process was
served in Washington on a sales solicitor employed by
defendant company. Defendant's motion to set aside the
order was denied and defendant was held subject to the
jurisdiction of the W ashingtou courts. Defendant was a
Delaware corporation having its principal place of business in Missouri. It was engaged in the manufacture and
sale of shoes. Defendant had no office in Washington,
made no contracts either for the sale or the purchase
of merchandise there, maintained no stock of merchandise
and made no delivery of goods in intrastate connnerce.
During the years in question defendant had employed 11
to 13 salesmen under direct supervision and control of
sales managers located in St. Louis. These sales1nen re-
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sided in Washington. Their principal activities were confined to that state and they were compensated by commissions based upon the amount of sales. Defendant supplied these salesmen with a line of samples. On occasions
they rented sample rooms in business buildings or hotels,
for which defendant reimbursed them. The salesmen
transmitted their orders to defendant in Missouri, which
orders were subject to its approval. The court held that
defendant was subject to Washington judicial jurisdiction. The court stated:
"Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their
de facto power over the defendant's person. Hence
his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of
a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. Penn oyer v. Neff,
95 U.S. 714, 733, 24 L. Ed. 565. But now that the
capias ad respondendum has given way to personal
service of summons or other form of notice, due
process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the
maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' "
"Those demands may be met by such contacts
of the corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable·, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the corporation
to defend the particular suit which is brought
there. An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which
would result to the corporation from a trial away
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from its 'home' or principal place of business is
relevant in this connection."

*

"Conversely it has been generally recognized
that the casual presence of the corporate agent or
even his conduct of single or isolated items of
activities in a state in the corporation's behalf
are not enough to subject it to suit on causes of
action unconnected with the activities there. St.
Clair v. Cox, supra, 106 U.S. 359, 360, 1 S. Ct. 362,
363, 27 L. Ed. 222; Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v.
McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21, 27 S. Ct. 236, 240, 51
L. Ed. 345; Frene v. Louisville Cement ·Co., supra,
77 U.S. App. D.C. 133, 134 F.2d 515, 146 A.L.R.
926, and cases cited. To require the corporation
in such circumstances to defend the suit away from
its home or other jurisdiction where it carries on
more substantial activities has been thought to lay
too great and unreasonable burden on the corporation to comport with due process.''
Tested by the principles there laid dov."'TI, to make
the Illinois statute applicable to the situation at bar
would deny to defendant due process of law. It is to be
noted that the minimum contacts with the state must be
such that the maintainance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
Certainly to hold this defendant subject to Illinois jurisdiction would offend in the manner indicated. No case
with such minimal contacts as here has been cited to uphold plaintiff's position.
This case expressly recognizes the rule that single or
isolated activities are not enough to subject even a corporation, let alone an individual, to state jurisdiction. To
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require this Utah resident to defend the action in Illinois
under these facts would place too great and unreasonable
a burden upon him "to comport with due process of law."
We submit that to give this statute the construction
contended for by plaintiff would make it violative of the
due process clause of the XIVth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and hence void and not entitled to full
faith and credit.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the judgment here sued
upon does not come within the protection of the full faith
and credit clause of the United States Constitution. The
defendant's act of making a contract for the purchase of
two horses from a resident of Chicago and then picking
up the horses through an agent does not constitute the
transaction of any business within Illinois within the Illinois statute. If this statute were so construed it would
violate the due proces's clause of the United States Constitution and would hence be unconstitutional and a judgment based thereon would be void.
We respectfully submit that the judgment of the
District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, ROBERTS & BLACK
Counsel for Resp,ondent
530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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